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NATO begins the year 2000, ready to play its part in helping to create a "Europe
whole and free." This is the possibility created by circumstance and by all the efforts
made during the 1990s to adapt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to new realities
and to European security needs of the next century. But a Europe "whole and free"
can become reality only if the lessons of the past century, the most tragic in history,
are well learned; and only if each of the nations and peoples in the Atlantic Alliance is
prepared to complete the work begun by NATO, other institutions, and a wide variety
of thoughtful leaders, in and out of government, in the wake of the Cold War.
Following the Second World War, a number of far-sighted people on both sides
of the Atlantic understood that Europe could not return to the politics of the past that
had produced the First and Second World Wars; the result of that vision was creation
of the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European
Communities, and other institutions, both within Europe and linking it to North
America. At heart, they were all directed toward security, in the broadest sense of the
term. For the next four decades, these institutions –and the nations and peoples
belonging to them– stood together against challenges and threats, both from abroad
and from within; in the process, they also created a period of unparalleled prosperity
within Western Europe and solidified democratic rights and practices throughout the
region. This was an achievement of historical proportions.
After the Berlin Wall opened in November 1989, followed by the collapse of
almost all the communist regimes of Central Europe and then the Soviet Union itself,
many people believed it was time for at least one of these institutions –NATO– also
to be dismantled. It had served its essential purpose, well and truly, as its adversary,
the Warsaw Pact, was consigned to the "dustbin of history." Some commentators even
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argued that history had come to an end: that the ideological struggles that had been so
prominent in Europe had, after centuries, finally come to an end.
But this was not to be. History is not so malleable; and the course of human
development is not so certain that all concerns with security on the Continent could be
consigned to the past. Within a limited period, it again became clear that there were still
further tasks to be undertaken in order to ensure that Europe would not again face the
uncertainties, instabilities, and other challenges that had given it such an unfortunate
history, not least in the century just ending. Fortunately, we now know, the NATO
Alliance was not dismantled in the first flush of understanding that the Cold War had
been brought to a successful resolution (nor had the European Union, itself created for
a security purpose, been dismantled, as it had developed positive political and economic
reasons for being). Indeed, even in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, all the
then 16 NATO allies had come to a common understanding: that it was far better for
them to continue organizing their military defenses together –including even those
countries that were not formally members of the Alliance's integrated military structure–
than to go their separate ways, as had traditionally happened throughout history to
successful alliances once the task that had brought them together had been achieved, In
the process, it was remarkable that two countries which had not been fully engaged
militarily with the Alliance moved in that direction: Spain became a full member of the
integrated military structure in 1999; and France rejoined NATO's Military Committee
and created the basis for perhaps, once again, becoming a formal member of the integrated
structure. Thus, perhaps unique among history's great military alliances, NATO continued,
even in the absence of a compelling rationale for its existence. 
That rationale was not long in coming. By the middle of the 1990s, it was clear
that the future of European security required some institution to give definition,
structure, and content to efforts to enable the societies in Europe to be proof against
the reemergence of circumstances that could lead to renewed threats to comity on the
Continent. Paraphrasing Voltaire, if NATO did not exist, it would have been necessary
to invent it. And reinvent it all sixteen allies did.
During the 1990s, the allies developed four basic goals for the Alliance, each of
which has been instrumental in defining its future.
First has been to confirm America's engagement in Europe. Unlike what happened
in 1919, and for a time after 1945, the United States this time did not depart from Europe,
but made clear that it was on the Continent to stay –a true European power. Indeed, this
now seems to be in America a settled historical question, deeply embedded in the American
psyche and politics, and accepted by broad segments of popular opinion in both political
parties. For virtually all European states, this has been welcome news, including –for most
but not all members of the Alliance– the willingness of the United States to provide
leadership at critical moments for common enterprises. Of course, for the United States
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to be engaged strategically and militarily in Europe means preserving and extending the
NATO Alliance; not only is this an alliance that works and that is effective; but it is also
an alliance in which the U.S. continues to have a preponderance of influence.
In parallel with this classic role for NATO in anchoring the United States to
European security, the Alliance has also renewed its goal of preserving the best of what
it did during the Cold War, beyond the now-defunct tasks of containing communism
and Soviet power. NATO also stands as one element of a broad pattern of associations,
institutions, attitudes, and practices that have achieved something that rarely happens:
the actual resolution of a major historic problem, in this case ensuring a peaceful and
productive place for Germany in European society. There is, today, no "German
problem;" the notion that Germany and one or more neighbors would again go to war
is considered nonsense. But considerable effort has gone into ensuring that outcome
in the future –thus the government of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl sought to
"surround" united Germany with both NATO and the European Union, so that a
strong and influential Federal Republic would be seen as acting within these institutions
rather than as a completely independent entity.
At the same time, something else remarkable happened during the Cold War,
which only became fully evident when the scaffolding of East-West confrontation was
dismantled: that the 15 members of the European Union had managed, during their
years of political, social, and economic development, to achieve a success that no other
association of such different states and peoples had ever done; they have abolished war
as an instrument of their relations with one another: they have created a "European
Civil Space." While this Civil Space is by no means under challenge, preserving
institutional arrangements –of which NATO is one– remains a valuable activity.
These goals for NATO are important; but they are essentially about the past or at
least about ensuring that trials and troubles of the past do not reemerge. But NATO has
undertaken new tasks, as well, beginning with a particular vocation in Central Europe.
Along with other institutions (notably the EU), NATO is engaged in enabling these
societies that for so long languished behind the Iron Curtain (some of which had not for
many years or decades even been independent states) to take their full and rightful place
within the West, as free, democratic states, with market economies, fully participating
in Euro-Atlantic institutions and Western life. In the process, NATO seeks to create
predictability, stability, and confidence among these states –not that of the communist
and Soviet times, when stability and freedom were antithetical concepts, but that of
societies developing according to their own democratic lights at home and confident that
they will not again become the playthings of the great powers. In central Europe, NATO
has sought no less than to abolish gray areas, buffer zones, spheres of influence and
–potentially– even to move the Continent beyond the three-and-a-half century practice
of the balance of power as has, in fact, been successfully done in Western Europe.
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A final NATO goal is perhaps the most difficult. It is in recognition that, from
today's vantage point, only one country, the Russian Federation, seems capable in the
foreseeable future of again upsetting general understandings about security in Europe.
Early in the 1990s, therefore, Western leaders adopted a strategy of trying to help Russia
succeed as a society –politically, economically, socially. This drew upon an historic lesson
learned in regard to Germany. In 1919 and afterward, Germany was severely mistreated,
and many historians believe that this helped to produce Adolf Hitler's political appeal
in Germany. After the Second World War, by contrast, the allied powers treated defeated
Germany the opposite way –as a country to be rehabilitated, democratized, and brought
into the community of nations– and this worked, perhaps beyond even the hopes of the
era's leaders. Thus Western leaders in this decade have sought to treat Russia in the
second manner: a society to be supported at home and to be drawn out of its isolation,
to play a full an honored place in European life, including a role in European security.
Thus NATO assumed a purpose of helping to integrate Russia in the outside world, if
indeed it were prepared to play by the same rules as other European states. In this way,
it has been hoped, the reemergence of a "Russian problem" can be forestalled, not through
renewed containment but rather through active engagement.
These are NATO's goals for the period ahead; they are embraced by all 19 of the
allies; and during recent years, the NATO allies have taken major steps to achieve them.
Indeed, the allies have had the ambition of creating a form of security on the Continent
that can, at least in some measure, benefit all European states –leaving aside the handful,
like the Yugoslav Republic, that are not yet prepared to respect the rights of neighbors–
while no state loses in security. Thus NATO has undertaken a number of basic structural
and political changes, each designed to reinforce the others, and all needed to create
an overall framework of European security, though to be complemented by the efforts
of other institutions, such as the EU, the Western European Union (WEU), and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
In the popular imagination, NATO's most important step has been to begin taking
in new members from Central Europe –known popularly as enlargement or expansion.
The first three countries to join as full allies –Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic–
did so in March 1999. These were the most obvious candidates for NATO membership,
in that, among the 12 declared Central European aspirants, they were judged to be the
most ready. The criteria, explicit or implicit, included progress in democratization,
development of market economies, reform of militaries, and renunciation of any claims
against neighbors. Not coincidentally, two of the three (Poland and the Czech Republic)
also border on Germany –with its ambition of being "surrounded" by NATO– and sit
astride the axis between Western Europe and Russia. 
But the decision by the NATO heads of states and government at the Madrid Summit
in July 1997 to take in these three countries was complemented by a second step: the
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allies' recommitment to keep the door to NATO membership open to other countries
–specifically, to any European country ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities
of NATO membership, as a military and political-military institution. This "open door"
policy has yet to be tested; but it will be in 2001, the next time the 19 allied leaders have
pledged to meet at the summit and, on that occasion, to review the progress of individual
aspirants in meeting at least the declared requirements for membership.
As important as enlarging NATO is for the Alliance and for Central Europe states
that want the best possible assurances that they will not have to repeat any of their
national nightmares in an insecure Europe, other steps taken by the Alliance are just
as important in building an overall framework. Most important is the so-called
Partnership for Peace (PfP), created at the time of the January 1994 NATO summit.
In addition to the allies, PfP embraces 24 countries from Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union, including states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. This remarkable
institution has two basic purposes. The first is to act as a means for reforming and
modernizing the militaries of countries that want to join NATO, so that, when
parliaments seek to learn whether they are ready to undertake responsibilities as allies,
the answer is likely to be "Yes." Even more important, however, is the second PfP
purpose: to enable countries that do not join NATO, at least not at first, to take part
in virtually all that the Alliance does –from adopting common NATO standards and
training with NATO, to engaging in allied military exercises and even taking part in
NATO's military actions, such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the
Kosovo Force (KFOR). PfP has in fact been a great success, especially in helping to
change the militaries of many member states and in developing democratic institutions,
beginning with but not limited to the militaries themselves. And along with PfP is a
new sister institution, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a fledging forum
for talking about common issues.
While the first four of NATO's efforts –enlargement, open door, PfP, and EAPC–
primarily benefit the security requirements of Central European states, NATO also has
its goal of drawing Russia out of its seventy-plus-year self-imposed isolation. Without
compromising the interests of the Central Europeans or others, NATO thus reached out
to Russia and gained its agreement to a NATO-Russia Founding Act, which was signed
at the Elysee Palace in May 1997. The Founding Act consists of two broad parts: one
preserves for NATO its freedom of action; but the other looks to cooperation, consultation,
and even common action between NATO and Russia. The latter operates through a
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which meets at NATO headquarters in
Brussels, with the two sides' acting as equals. While ensuring that Russia's role within
the NATO Alliance, itself, is limited to a "voice but not a veto," the PJC does hold open
the prospect for substantial joint efforts, including in major security areas, such as
preventing the further spread if nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
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There is even an aspiration –still a long way off, if it could ever be achieved– to create a
"strategic partnership" between NATO and the Russian Federation.
Along with the Founding Act and creating the PJC, NATO also gained Russian
participation in the Bosnia Stabilization Force, where 1400 Russian soldiers take part
on the same basis as others, including those of NATO and the PfP countries. And
Russia is also taking part in KFOR, in Kosovo.
In addition to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the allies also recognized that
Ukraine has a special place in European security. Given its location, history, and current
circumstances, it is clear that Ukraine's success will be important in determining whether
there can, indeed, be a new era of peace on the Continent. In recognition of Ukraine's
special place, the allies thus negotiated a NATO-Ukraine Charter and created a NATO-
Ukraine Commission. This effort is not as ambitious as the relationship with Russia;
but its role is consequential in helping Ukraine take its place within the West and
preserve its independence and sovereignty. 
In reforming itself to meet the needs of the 21st century, NATO also took three
further steps. The first was to change its basic military doctrine and to revise its military
command structure, reducing the number of its military commands from 65 to 20, as
befits a Europe that is no longer divided, and where the West no longer has to confront
and contain a Soviet Union. In the process, NATO has developed added capacities for
peacekeeping and peacemaking, as well as the ability to deploy forces farther afield,
among other things making use of a new concept, the Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) headquarters.
The second step was to create a so-called Mediterranean Dialogue, designed to
recognize the increased importance to the allies of countries to the south and southeast.
States joining initially were Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan;
and activities have so far been largely limited to occasional discussions about generalized
security issues, conducted by NATO with each member individually. This is not much
of a relationship; but at least it reflects that some of the allies do perceive potential
challenges emanating from the far shores of the Mediterranean, though more of a political
and economic nature (including migration) than relating to military issues. Creation of
the Dialogue also reflects the fact that, in the post-Cold War epoque, security interests,
broadly-defined, vary among different members of the Atlantic Alliance. (Far more
important has been the European Union's so-called Barcelona Process.)
Finally, the NATO allies have recognized the importance both of supporting
European efforts to complete integration, focussed in the European Union, and of
enabling European states to undertake a greater share of the burdens of defense in the
transatlantic region. Western European Union actually antedates NATO; and, in recent
years, the Europeans have been developing, largely based on WEU, a European Security
and Defense Identity (ESDI), which in time is designed to be responsive to European
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Union direction as part of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 1996,
therefore, NATO reached agreement with WEU that the ESDI would be created, but
within NATO, not outside of and in direct competition with it. ESDI would be
"separable but not separate" from NATO; this arrangement would, in effect, allow
Europeans to "borrow the army" –or, more accurately– to make use of assets in NATO,
such as officers and command structures (including CJTF), and equipment, including
some provided by the United States. This arrangement would enable Europeans to act
militarily on their own if they chose to do so, while at the same preserving the integrity
and capacity of NATO and reducing the extent to which the Europeans would need
to duplicate military capacities –anyway something that few if any European states are
prepared to do at a time of budgetary stringency.
By 1995, NATO had clearly agreed on its four central goals for the future and
had made major progress on its key steps to implement these goals. But in the meantime,
Europe, including the region closest to Western Europe, was not in fact at peace. War
was raging in Bosnia, without apparent end. Early on, all the major powers of Europe
–including the United States and Russia– had determined that the Bosnia conflict was
of relatively minor account; that, in any event, it would be contained and kept from
escalating into a wider European war. Indeed, basic responsibility in Bosnia was ceded
to the United Nations which, among other things, deployed a so-called UN Protection
Force (UNPROFOR), while NATO limited itself to keeping aircraft from the skies
over Bosnia, blockading the coast (jointly with WEU) against embargoed arms supplies,
and being ready to use air power in support of UN objectives. But the war continued,
with substantial loss of life and little prospect for the success of diplomatic efforts to
bring it to a halt.
It became clear, however, that the NATO allies could not turn aside from the
Bosnia conflict. Not only was this producing the worst suffering, tragedy, and even
atrocities in Europe since the end of the World War II, but it was eroding popular
confidence that NATO could be a viable security institution for the future. Indeed,
the more that NATO reinvented itself and developed both new purposes and the means
to fulfill them, the more it found that the moral and political basis for its continued
existence depended on its taking decisive action over Bosnia. Finally, in the summer
of 1995, after the atrocities at Srebrenica, the allies agreed to use air power in defense
of so-called UN-designated "safe areas" in Bosnia –after seven other occasions on which
NATO had reached such agreement but had then failed to follow through. And,
following a Bosnian Serb provocation, NATO engaged in a 20-day air campaign. Along
with a Croat-Muslim ground offensive and engagement of British and French artillery,
the Bosnia War was brought to an end, the Dayton Accords were reached, NATO
deployed the Implementation Force (IFOR –now SFOR), and Bosnia gained its first
chance to try building a peaceful future.
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The NATO allies had not yet thoroughly learned the lessons of Bosnia, however,
and they were fated to face even more difficult dilemmas in Kosovo, again forced upon
them by Serbia and its president, Slobodan Milosevic. Kosovo was unlike Bosnia,
however, in that it was not a sovereign state but a part of Serbia. At the same time,
NATO had no mandate from the United Nations Security Council to act –something
of significant importance to many of the NATO allies. Further, as in Bosnia, the Alliance
itself was not in charge of diplomacy over Kosovo, but had to depend on diplomatic
efforts of individual states or, in this case, the so-called Contact Group of the U.S.,
UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Yet diplomacy failed, in part because it was
not well-conceived and in part because it was episodic –the political will to deal effectively
with Kosovo was lacking. Following atrocities in a place called Racak in January 1999,
the Contact Group tried a last round of diplomacy at Rambouillet and Paris and, when
that failed, NATO decided to undertake what was believed would be an air campaign
lasting only a few days. Milosevic, however, had other plans and used the start of NATO
bombing on March 24 to launch his own massive campaign of killing tens of thousands
of Albanian Kosovars –in various leadership positions– and of driving hundreds of
thousands of people over the borders of Albania and Macedonia. 
After 78 days, NATO eventually prevailed with its air campaign –which, uniquely
in the history of modern warfare, was achieved without a single allied combat fatality–
but at a heavy cost to the Albanian Kosovars and substantial destruction of the Serbian
economy. KFOR was deployed and the UN took over responsibilities for leading efforts
to rebuild Kosovo. Thus, as 1999 drew to a close, NATO found itself deployed in two
places in the former Yugoslavia and with heavy responsibilities for security in the
Balkans, overall.
In 2000, NATO faces a number of key challenges. But they all fit within the
framework of the renovated Alliance; all are part of making NATO's new instruments
and practices effective. But making them effective will be the test of its role in helping
to create a Europe truly "whole and free." Several issues stand out and, not surprisingly,
most have been affected by the 1999 war over Kosovo. Indeed, overlapping the
Washington NATO summit, that conflict played an important role in shaping NATO's
future, at least for the period immediately ahead.
To begin with, the allies have for some time been debating the extent of NATO's
reach, as it has moved beyond its old area of activity, generally assumed to be limited
by the formal requirements of Article V of the Washington Treaty, the strategic guarantee
of allied territories against external aggression. The United States has been most ambitious
for NATO, including a desire to see it ready to project power into areas that could, at
least notionally, encompass the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, and possibly even beyond.
While not countering directly U.S. pressures for increased power-projection capabilities,
most of the European allies (plus Canada) have had a more restricted view of how far
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the Alliance, itself, could become engaged militarily, although they did accept that so-
called "coalitions of the willing" might choose to take military action in areas where
threats could emerge to the interests of one or more Western states. At the Washington
summit, the allies did agree on a somewhat permissive formulation: that the Alliance
was about defense of "interests" and not just territory. But the Kosovo War effectively
settled debate, at least for the time being. Given the difficulties of the conflict, not least
to preserve cohesion within the Alliance in face of severe misgivings on the part of
several allied states about both purposes and means, it now appears that NATO will
be unlikely to agree on collective military action elsewhere beyond territories already
embraced by some plausible definition of the term "Europe."  While there are
commitments to common defense in the event of attacks on allies –including the
possibility of threats from terrorism or weapons of mass destruction– discretionary
military action appears to be highly circumscribed.
In tandem, the war over Kosovo also strained the limits of forbearance among many
allies in terms of requirements for international legal justification for taking military
action. Early in the 1990s, post-Cold War NATO agreed that it would consider taking
military action, on a case-by-case basis, in response to requests either by the OSCE or
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This the Alliance did in Bosnia, in
response to various UNSC resolutions. But there was no such legal basis for acting over
Kosovo, because of the threat of a Russian veto. Pressed to choose to act without a formal
mandate or to tolerate Serbian atrocities, the allies elected to act, but with each of them
determining for itself what legal basis was sufficient. Again, in view of the course of the
conflict and lessons drawn from it, many of the allies could be expected to be highly
reluctant again to accept NATO military action without some form of clear external
legal mandate. This does create a problem for NATO's future, since the same dilemma
–a possible veto by Russia or (perhaps) China of a UNSC resolution calling upon NATO
to take military action– has not disappeared. Furthermore, it is also clear that standards
of international life have progressed to the point, at least in Europe, where the 352-year
old doctrine that gives preference to sovereign rights of states over either domestic human
or group rights is increasingly under challenge. Thus both for NATO's future and for
the cause of advancing the growing requirement that states show due respect for human
rights within their boundaries, there is a pressing need for updating international law
–whether through amendment of the U.N. Charter or some other means. This is not a
trivial matter; and it requires a thoughtful, profound solution.
Kosovo also pointed to a continuing weakness inherent in the role that NATO
has been asked to play in the post-Cold War world: the gap between its role as a military
instrument and the role of diplomatic actors that may have need of that instrument.
Thus NATO prosecuted the war in Kosovo; but as an institution it had no role in the
diplomacy whose lack of success led to NATO's being called upon to engage in its
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extended air campaign. Of course, NATO is not structured to be the active diplomatic
agent of its members. Not only is the NATO Secretary General not a foreign minister,
imbued with the necessary powers to negotiate on behalf of the 19 member nations,
but also few if any of those nations would be prepared to cede that authority to him.
Nevertheless, there needs to be far closer coordination between diplomacy and a potential
military role for NATO, such as was lacking both in Bosnia, prior to the NATO air
actions of the summer of 1995, and prior to its 1999 air campaign over Kosovo. This
puts an special burden on the leading powers of the Alliance; but if NATO is to be
used wisely and on behalf of the interests of all of its members, this diplomatic-military
gap needs to be narrowed considerably.
NATO's conduct of the Kosovo War underscored the need for another reform
within the Alliance or, more particularly, within the militaries of most of its members.
The United States bore most of the brunt of the fighting over Kosovo –the air campaign.
A major part of this was because the allies –probably without exception, despite some
differences in national rhetoric– wanted, as a major requirement of policy, to minimize
allied casualties, in order to sustain popular support for military action over a cause
that had a major humanitarian component but little of classic strategic importance.
Indeed, there were no allied combat fatalities. But this objective of limiting allied
casualties required placing great emphasis on high technology weaponry, where the
United States has the lion's share of that available to allied states. (Of course, if there
had been a ground phase of the military campaign, most of the risks to allied combat
forces would have been borne by the European allies). This has increased pressures by
the United States for its allies to modernize their military forces, where only the United
Kingdom is, in relative terms, keeping pace. At the Washington summit, the allies had
agreed upon a so-called Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) designed to upgrade allied
military forces, especially in their ability to be deployed at some distance, to be sustainable
in combat, and to be as survivable as possible. The DCI is also designed to increase the
capacity for allied forces to project power, including beyond Europe, in the event that
the Alliance chose to do so. After Kosovo, at the very least it became clear that the allies
would need to be better able to integrate their forces –the technical NATO term is to
make forces "interoperable"; but whether they will actually do so, in the face of major
budget constraints, is far from clear. This is a critical issue, if there is to be a viable
defense industrial base, spread across the Alliance; and if the resulting forces can, indeed,
preserve the critical integrated military structure, in both theory and practice. 
By the same token, the relative disparity between the size of the U.S. and allied
military roles in Kosovo has provided added impetus to European allies to increase
their own capacity to deal with crises without necessarily having to rely upon the United
States, or at least to rely so heavily. Thus the war helped to spur efforts to develop ESDI
and its companion Common Foreign and Security Policy –a move underscored when
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the NATO Secretary General, Spain's Javier Solana, assumed the new EU post of "Mr.
CFSP", the individual charged with developing common efforts and effective institutions
to give the EU a capacity for action in foreign policy and –through ESDI– in defense.
This added significance of ESDI, including a desire by France to see it able to act
without reliance upon NATO "assets," has stirred new debate within the Alliance about
the respective roles of institutions: NATO and Western European Union (or the EU,
when it assumes WEU's responsibilities for ESDI). It is important that this debate not
be overblown, however. ESDI has value because it helps in the completion of the work
of European integration, because it can give Europeans a greater latitude for determining
what they will do in a crisis, and because it can help to shift the relative military burdens
on the two sides of the Atlantic somewhat toward the Europeans as opposed to the
Americans. There should be no American objection to any of this. At the same time,
the Europeans should be cautious about claiming that ESDI can do more than it can,
before it gains real capabilities: for that could simply mislead the U.S. into believing it
can do less. Indeed, the Kosovo War dramatized that Europe is, if anything, even more
dependent on a U.S. role on the Continent than had been true before in the post-Cold
War period. In any event, it is unlikely that many –if any– of the European states will
spend the money needed to create military capabilities truly separate from NATO: the
only real risk is that resources will be shifted from increasing capabilities relevant to
NATO, without at the same time providing much ability for ESDI to act on its own. 
The resource question is proving to be important in another way, as well. What
has happened in the former Yugoslavia in recent years has dramatized that the Alliance
has a deep stake in the future of the Balkans –a region that has grown in importance
in recent years, not just for its sake, as a test whether the European Civil Space can, in
time, be extended here as well as elsewhere in Central Europe, but also because of
Western interests farther East, beginning with Turkey and extending to the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the Persian Gulf and subcontinent (with real and potential risks from one or
another form of weapons of mass destruction), the Caspian Sea with its potential for
oil exports, and the Caucasus, North and South. Buttressing the Balkans is thus of
considerable strategic importance, and doing so will require an extended Western
commitment, reflected not just in the Stabilization and Kosovo Forces, but also in the
need for significant resources for development in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in
efforts to stabilize and support neighboring states, including Albania and Macedonia,
as the two regional countries potentially most vulnerable, and to work for a resolution,
to the extent possible, of the triangular problems of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. At
the same time, added resources are needed to make Partnership for Peace even more
effective, both to reinforce success and to deepen the engagement of Central European
states in Western institutions, especially as they wait for full membership in NATO
and the EU. Such employment of resources, public and private (including major roles
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for Non-Governmental Organizations, or NGOs) is, of course, an excellent investment
in the future of European security and development, in all dimensions, and it should
gain the full support of allied states, while the EU also plays its proper role.
At the same time, the conduct and outcome of the Kosovo conflict has played an
indirect role in shaping two central questions about NATO's future: its relations with
Central Europe and Russia. The allies have prosecuted efforts regarding both; and they
have kept these dual interests, with their inherent tensions, reasonably in balance:
engaging Central European states progressively in Euro-Atlantic institutions (including
membership already for three of them), while also reaching out to Russia and engaging
it as fully in Western security policy as is acceptable to both sides and does not somehow
give Russia a veto over what NATO does with the Central Europeans. 
Kosovo helped to reopen some of these matters, including the issue of the pace and
direction of NATO expansion. For one thing, the Kosovo War demonstrated to allies
that taking in new members might not be the "free good" that many of them had assumed
it to be; but in fact it could entail real security obligations. Coupled with renewed
questioning of the process of enlargement, there was added pressure from Russia. During
the war, Moscow did eventually support allied demands made against Serbia's Milosevic
and, indeed, soon thereafter the war came to a halt. It was not surprising that Russia
demanded a price for what it saw to be its cooperation with NATO; one element was to
lecture NATO about again undertaking such a military operation and insisting that
discussion and decision on any such action be brought within the NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council. Further, Russian politicians argued that efforts to create
democracy at home, as well as at least a neutral attitude toward NATO, had been dealt
a serious setback. Thus, the Russian argument went, NATO must forbear from further
enlargement; most particularly, it should abandon any plans to include countries that
had once been part of the Soviet Union –a tactic clearly directed against the Baltic states.
Some allies –including the United States– strongly rejected this demand; others, however,
are certainly tempted, given deep concerns about the future of Russia and belief that it
could represent the only realistic potential threat to European comity for the foreseeable
future, however remote even this possibility may be.
Intensified concern about Russia's future could come into conflict with NATO's
declared intention to include Central European states fully within Euro-Atlantic institutions
–and this is clearly a Russian objective. But the balance struck in NATO policy between
providing confidence for Central European states about their future –no gray areas, buffer
states, or spheres of influence– is still sound policy and, indeed, a fundamental commitment
that is indispensable to NATO's future and to hopes of creating a Europe whole and free.
Thus it is important for the Alliance not to cede the Russian point, and not to cede that
it has more than a "voice" –certainly not a "veto"– on NATO decisions regarding third
countries. And the allies must have the political will to buttress this point.
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As it stands even without the role of Russia, expansion will pose difficult choices
for the allies. One is the general question whether the Alliance can still be effective if
it is larger. What has so far happened with the three new allies provides insufficient
experience to make a final judgment, although they did stand firm with the rest of the
Alliance during the Kosovo War, and they did so even though that war started less than
two weeks after they joined NATO and well before they had time to adjust to the new
reality. An honest appraisal has to be that they passed this "baptism of (political) fire."
But even if NATO expansion goes forward in 2001, which countries will be
selected? Slovenia is likely to be on every ally's list, and Slovakia, with a new, democratic
government, could be a serious contender; indeed, its domestic political failures had
kept it off the list of the first entrants. Beyond consideration of these two countries,
the allies clearly divide, with the Nordics' favoring at least one Baltic state and southern
allies' pressing for Romania, Bulgaria, or both. But these decisions are not trivial; and
how NATO makes them, as well as the selections, will have an important effect on the
Alliance's future.
Building NATO's future as an alliance equal to the demands of European security
in the new century has two further important elements. The first is not directly about
NATO, but about the EU. Strangely, these two institution are both based in Brussels,
but have little direct or formal contact with one another, for reasons that mostly derive
from internal European politics. This needs to change, and immediately –even before
the EU takes over responsibility for ESDI from the Western European Union. Both
institutions are engaged in Central Europe and with Russia; both are in the former
Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Kosovo; both have ambitious plans for expansion.
Sheer logic, as well as the need to coordinate all aspects of building security in Europe,
in the broadest sense of the term, call for close NATO-EU ties and day-to-day cooperation.
Finally, NATO's future depends absolutely on something often forgotten in the
effort to design new security structures: gaining the political and financial support of
allied parliaments and peoples. Without that support, there can be no alliance; and
gaining it requires constant, committed efforts of all allied governments, not just now
but well into the future. The stakes are enormous: this is truly the first generation that
has ever had a chance to try building security in Europe that can stretch across the
Continent, a 21st century security system that can, in some part, help to redeem the
tragedies of the 20th. This is surely worth all the effort needed to make it happen. 
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